Rhe Editor Zambia
Fred M’membe’s latest write up on Zambia’s constitutional order which has gone viral is long on alarm, historical comparisons and predictions, but considerably weaker when it comes to establishing the central proposition on which his argument rests, namely that Zambia is presently witnessing a “constitutional coup” designed to facilitate a third term for President Hakainde Hichilema.
That is an extremely serious allegation, and it therefore requires more than connecting separate constitutional amendments and asking citizens to assume that they form part of a hidden plan to achieve an outcome that has not been formally proposed. 
M’membe is entitled to oppose any future attempt to alter the presidential term limit, and he is equally entitled to demand that President Hichilema state his position on the matter.
However, there is a fundamental difference between demanding an assurance about a hypothetical future proposal and producing evidence that such a proposal is actually being prepared.
That evidence is conspicuously absent from his article.
M’membe’s argument begins by presenting the constitutional amendments of 2025 as the first instalment of a carefully planned process.
He then connects the expansion of Parliament, the introduction of proportional representation, and the removal of term limits for mayors and council chairpersons to the possibility of a future attempt to remove the presidential term limit.
However, political developments cannot simply be connected in a sequence and then presented as proof of a predetermined intention.
Each constitutional amendment must be examined according to what it actually changed and the constitutional procedure through which it was enacted.
M’membe also makes a serious assertion about the Constitutional Court’s decision concerning Bill 7. He presents the court as having declared the Bill unconstitutional because there had been no wide public consultation and then suggests that the government responded by establishing a technical committee to manufacture the consultation that had been found missing.
Such an interpretation requires very careful examination of the actual judgment rather than political characterisation of it. A constitutional debate cannot be strengthened by attributing conclusions to a court that the court itself did not make.
There is also a fundamental problem with M’membe’s attempt to equate the removal of term limits for mayors and council chairpersons with the removal or impending removal of the presidential term limit.
These are different constitutional and political offices with different legal provisions which govern eligibility and tenure. The fact that Parliament amended the law relating to local government office holders does not, by itself, establish that the presidential term limit has been weakened or that the government has decided to abolish it.
M’membe asks why Zambians should regard the presidential term limit as safe when a term limit applicable to mayors and council chairpersons has been removed.
That is a legitimate political question, but it remains a political question. It is not evidence that President Hichilema intends to seek a third term.
The same applies to his treatment of the enlargement of Parliament. The increase in the number of constituencies and the introduction of proportional representation can and should be debated.
Zambians are entitled to ask whether a larger Parliament is affordable, whether it will improve representation and whether the new system will deliver the intended benefits for women, young people, and persons with disabilities. Those are important questions.
However, transforming that parliamentary reform into evidence of a presidential third-term project requires another step for which M’membe provides no evidence.
His argument becomes even more speculative when he turns to events that have not happened. M’membe predicts that the government will initially deny plans for a third term, that somebody else will eventually raise the proposal, that grassroots organisations will supposedly demand it, that President Hichilema will reluctantly accept it in the national interest and that Parliament will eventually approve it.
But a prediction, however confidently expressed, is not evidence.
M’membe himself effectively acknowledges this when he says that he would be glad to be proved wrong. That admission is important because it makes clear that much of his article is a warning about what he believes might happen rather than an account of what is actually happening.
M’membe’s comparison with Frederick Chiluba’s third-term attempt in 2001 also deserves careful consideration. The historical episode is an important part of Zambia’s democratic experience, and the mobilisation of civil society, churches, professional bodies and political actors against the proposed third term remains an important part of the country’s constitutional history.
But the existence of the 2001 experience does not mean that every constitutional amendment undertaken by a subsequent government is necessarily part of another third-term campaign. History can provide warnings, but it cannot substitute for evidence.
The same caution should apply to M’membe’s references to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Guinea. Those countries have experienced significant constitutional and political changes concerning presidential tenure, and their experiences can certainly be studied.
However, Zambia has its own constitution, institutions, political history, and legal safeguards. A comparative example may raise questions, but it does not prove that the same process is occurring in Zambia.
Perhaps the most problematic feature of M’membe’s argument is that he asks Zambians to fear an event that has not been proposed while treating that possibility as though it were already a government programme.
If there is a government document proposing the removal of the presidential term limit, it should be produced. If a minister, Member of Parliament, provincial official or UPND structure has formally proposed a third term for President Hichilema, that evidence should be placed before the public.
If such a proposal is eventually brought before Parliament, it should receive the full scrutiny required by the Constitution.
Until then, however, the country should distinguish between what is known and what is feared.
The debate over Zambia’s Constitution is too important to be reduced to political prophecy.
If President Hichilema or the UPND government eventually proposes removing the presidential term limit, that proposal should be subjected to rigorous public scrutiny.
Parliamentarians should be held accountable for their positions, civil society should participate in the debate, the courts should perform their constitutional functions, and citizens should make their voices heard through lawful democratic means.
Until that happens, however, Zambia should not allow political speculation to become constitutional facts merely because it has been repeated with sufficient confidence.
