The Editor Zambia
The political reunion between Brian Mundubile and Makebi Zulu is not merely an alliance of convenience ahead of elections but the latest expression of a deeply rooted political tradition that has shaped Zambia’s power dynamics since independence.
Beneath the slogans of unity and constitutionalism lies the enduring ambition of the Chambeshi and Luangwa political establishment to reclaim and preserve dominance over national politics while resisting the rise of leaders from the Zambezi region (Southern, Western and North western) region. 
For decades, Zambia’s political establishment was largely controlled by a North and East alliance composed of, Luapulans, Muchingans, Easterners, Northerners, and sections of the Copperbelt political elite.
From the days of Kenneth Kaunda and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) era, political power was carefully centralised within this bloc.
The infamous Choma Declaration effectively criminalised opposition politics and buried the African National Congress (ANC) of Harry Nkumbula, whose support base came largely from the south and west of the country.
The so-called peace accord of 1973 was, in reality, the consolidation of political monopoly, leading to Zambia becoming a one-party state resulting in dissenting political traditions associated with the Zambezi region being systematically weakened and portrayed as politically suspicious.
The message was unmistakable. Leadership belonged to the Chambeshi and Luangwa axis, while others were expected to remain junior partners in the national project.
That mentality never truly disappeared even after the return of multiparty democracy but simply evolved. What many Zambians don’t know is that the Patriotic Front (PF) itself emerged from a Bemba pressure group before transforming into a national party.
The roots of the PF were closely tied to the Kola Foundation and a broader Bemba political consciousness that later found expression through the populist politics of Michael Chilufya Sata.
While the party eventually expanded nationally, its core political identity remained heavily anchored in the North Eastern axis.
Now, the coming together of Mundubile and Zulu signals the reorganisation of that old establishment under a different banner.
Their project is not simply about policy alternatives or democratic competition but about restoring a political order of Bemba/East hegemony that many within that bloc believe was interrupted by the election of President Hakainde Hichilema in 2021.
The hostility directed at Hichilema since he assumed office cannot honestly be explained by policy disagreements alone but rooted in discomfort that a Tonga speaking leader from Southern Province shattered a decades old political ceiling.
To many within the old establishment, the issue is not merely President Hichilema the politician but is that he is a Tonga president who successfully disrupted an entrenched political hierarchy.
That is why every reform initiative is immediately framed as tribalism, while similar actions by previous administrations were defended as normal governance.
Bill 7, economic reforms, institutional changes, and anti-corruption measures have all been attacked with an intensity that often reveals deeper ethnic anxieties beneath the surface rhetoric.
The criticism is frequently disguised as a concern for democracy or constitutionalism, but the underlying resentment is unmistakable.
Tongaphobia has remained one of the most under acknowledged realities of Zambia’s politics because since the rise of the United Party for National Development (UPND), many opponents have persistently portrayed the party as a tribal project despite its national electoral appeal and broadening support base.
Ironically, those making such accusations often come from political formations historically dominated by narrow regional and tribal interests themselves.
The pattern is impossible to ignore because the loudest critics of Hichilema and the fiercest opponents of constitutional reforms overwhelmingly emerge from the same North Eastern political bloc.
This is not coincidence but reflects a long- standing political reflex conditioned by decades of dominance and the belief that leadership outside their sphere represents a threat to the natural order of power.
Yet Zambia today is changing with sober, non-tribal citizens increasingly judging leaders on performance rather than regional entitlement.
President Hichilema inherited an economy from PF burdened by debt distress, collapsing investor confidence and institutional decay.
His administration stabilised the economy, restored international credibility, and reopened engagement with global partners.
But for those trapped in the old politics of tribal entitlement, no achievement will ever be enough because their grievance is fundamentally not about governance but identity.
The tragedy is that those who preach national unity are often the quickest to mobilise tribal suspicion when political power slips away from their preferred regions.
They accuse others of division while quietly nurturing the very prejudices that continue to poison national politics.
Zambia cannot move forward while sections of the political elite continue treating leadership as hereditary property reserved for certain ethnic blocs.
The country belongs equally to all its citizens, whether from Bweengwa, Kasama, Chipata, Mongu, or Solwezi. Democracy means accepting that leadership can emerge from every corner of the republic.
The Mundubile and Zulu alliance is the most toxic and regional grouping that represents more than political cooperation, but a coming together of politicians ill-bent to perpetuate a dangerous hegemony to genocidal levels.
It is the latest attempt by an old political order to reassert itself against a changing Zambia that is slowly rejecting tribal entitlement and embracing a broader national identity.
