The Editor Zambia
Complaints that Brian Mundubile and Makebi Zulu may not appear on the presidential ballot for the August 13 elections miss a far bigger political reality in Zambia today: elections are not personal entitlement contests, and nostalgia for a past political order does not erase its record in the public mind.
There is a tendency among some political commentators and supporters of former ruling structures to frame electoral regulation, party disputes, and candidate eligibility as “frustration” or “orchestration” by the ruling party. 
Yet Zambia’s electoral process is governed by rules, institutions, and internal party dynamics that are often conveniently ignored when outcomes do not favour certain political figures.
Brian Mundubile’s claims that he is being targeted because of his popularity and follows a familiar script in Zambian politics. It is the narrative of victimhood—where legal, procedural, or internal party challenges are recast as political persecution.
But the electorate is increasingly less persuaded by such arguments. What matters to ordinary citizens is not who feels entitled to a ballot line, but what alternatives are genuinely being offered.
The reality is that Zambia has not forgotten the final years of the Patriotic Front (PF) governance. Whether one frames it as misrule, economic mismanagement, or contested policy direction, the period left deep political and economic scars that still shape public perception today.
Rising debt levels, governance controversies, and allegations of corruption have become part of the political memory that voters carry into every subsequent election cycle. To pretend that this memory does not exist is to misunderstand the electorate entirely.
So, when figures strongly associated with that political era seek to re-emerge at the centre of national leadership debates, it is unsurprising that scrutiny follows.
It is also unsurprising that internal party fractures, legal disputes, and questions of legitimacy arise around candidacies.
These are not manufactured obstacles—they are part of a political ecosystem still wrestling with its own history.
Equally important is the issue of political regrouping. There is a visible effort among some former PF-aligned actors to reorganise under new banners, alliances, and messaging strategies.
Critics argue that this is simply democratic participation. However, others see it as an attempt to recycle old political networks without meaningful reform or accountability. That perception matters in politics because trust is not automatically transferable from one election cycle to another.
The suggestion that regional blocs—often loosely referenced in political discourse—are attempting to dominate national politics again is equally problematic.
Zambia’s unity depends on resisting the temptation to reduce political competition into ethnic or regional arithmetic. While regional alliances exist in all democracies, framing them as domination narratives risks deepening suspicion among citizens rather than strengthening democratic debate.
What Zambians need is issue-based politics, not identity-based alarmism.
If Mundubile or Makebi Zulu are not on the ballot, the explanation should not be reduced to conspiracy. It should be understood through the lens of party processes, legal requirements, and political competition.
Parties choose candidates. Courts interpret disputes. Electoral bodies enforce compliance. None of these institutions operate in a vacuum of political preference.
It is also worth stating plainly: democracy is not weakened when certain individuals are absent from the ballot.
In fact, democracy often strengthens when it is clear that no candidate has automatic entitlement to leadership positions.
The idea that an election is incomplete without specific names is not democratic logic—it is personality-driven politics.
Zambians are also more politically aware today than at any other time in recent history. They have lived through multiple administrations, shifting economic conditions, and repeated cycles of political promises and disappointments.
As a result, voters are increasingly less interested in emotional narratives of exclusion and more interested in tangible governance alternatives.
Accusations that the ruling United Party for National Development (UPND) is “afraid” of certain candidates may generate headlines, but they do not necessarily reflect electoral reality.
Incumbent governments always face criticism from opposition figures, especially in the run-up to elections. That is not evidence of manipulation—it is the nature of competitive politics.
What should concern the public more is not who appears on the ballot, but whether the available choices represent genuine renewal, accountability, and policy clarity.
Zambia’s democratic maturity depends on moving beyond recycled political grievances and toward serious engagement with national challenges.
If anything, the debate around Mundubile and Makezi Zulu should serve as a reminder that political relevance is not inherited from past positions or party history.
It is earned through public trust, consistent accountability, and credible vision for the future.
In that sense, complaints about their absence risk missing the point entirely. Zambia is not short of political actors. It is short of political transformation.
